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Global hunger is widely seen as one of the foremost 
threats to humanity. The Constitutionality of the Right to 
Food has been a long-standing debate within the Indian 
Subcontinent as there is no explicit mention of the said 
right. Through various judicial pronouncements over a 
relatively long period of time, the right to food has been 
construed to be constitutionally ingrained. This paper 
explores the history of the right to food as a fundamental 
right in India, as per the Constitution. It analyses 
landmark cases on the right to food and examines the 
fundamental right to food, in terms of state obligations. Is 
the impact of the entrenchment of the right to food as a 
fundamental right, limited only to its symbolic meaning? 
Or has such right substantively shaped the contours of 
governmental policies too? What are the remedial 
interventions that the judiciary has made in view of the 
constitutional right to food? These are questions that the 
paper will explore. In this process, the paper will parse 
various judicial orders on the right to food and identify 
whether there are justiciable entitlements that 
presumptively constitute the core of the right. Further, the  
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paper shall also highlight the multidimensionality of the 
right to food and illustrate that starting with Francis 
Mullin in the 1980s, to Laxmi Mandal and Swaraj 
Abhiyan in this decade. The courts have, through the 
above mentioned judgments, underscored the 
interrelatedness between the rights to food, health, shelter 
and right to work. 
Keywords: Article 21 of the Constitution of India, Conditional 
Social Sight Approach, Content of the Right, People‟s Union for 
Civil Liberties, Right to Food, Francis  Coralie, Swaraj Abhiyan  
I. Introduction 
We, the Heads of State and Government, or our representatives, 
gathered at the World Food Summit at the invitation of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, reaffirm the 
right of everyone to have access to safe and nutritious food, 
consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental 
right of everyone to be free from hunger.1 
Global hunger is widely seen as one of the foremost threats to 
humanity. In fact, the World Food Programme asserts that “hunger 
and malnutrition are in fact the number one risk to health 
worldwide— greater than AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis 
combined.”2 This is reflected in the estimates of the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization which suggest that about 795 
million people of the 7.3 billion people in the world, were suffering 
from chronic undernourishment in 2014-2016. Worryingly for 
India, one of the largest number  of undernourished people hails 
from this country. India has, therefore, been placed 97th out of 118 
countries, on the Global Hunger Index, by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute in Washington.3 Ironically, such 
                                                          
1Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of 
Action 1996, http://www.fao.org/docrep/ 003/ w3613e/ w3613e00.htm. 
2World Food Programme, Hunger, available at 
https://www.wfp.org/hunger (last visited on Oct. 29, 2016). 
3Priyanka Vora, India Has Programmes to Alleviate Hunger But Not the Will 
to Enforce Them, Scroll.in, Oct. 15, 2016, 
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widespread starvation and hunger exists in a context of adequate 
food production. Global per capita availability of food has risen 
from about 2220 kcal/person/day in the early 1960s to 2790 
kcal/person/day in the last decade.4 The problem of starvation, 
therefore, arises primarily from the problems of unequal 
distribution and access to food.5 
Amartya Sen had famously argued that the Great Bengal famine of 
1943 was not a direct product of overall shortage of production of 
food crops but a consequence of the powerful inflationary impact 
of the economic distortions caused by policy changes after the 
Second World War.6 It has been claimed that the response to 
hunger must focus as much on questions of social systems that 
ensure distributional access to food, as on total production.7 It is 
pertinent to note, in this context, that one can generally procure 
food by either producing the food himself or by buying it in the 
market. When they are not in a position to do either, especially due 
to lack of purchasing power, it becomes imperative to create legal 
entitlements to ensure access to food. A constitutional statutory 
right to food performs this valuable function towards guaranteeing 
access to food to all persons through justiciable entitlements. 
India has recognised the centrality of the right to food within its 
constitutional framework, right from the inception of the Republic. 
Article 47 of the Constitution asserts that the “[s]tate shall regard 
the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its 
people and the improvement of public health as among its primary 
duties”.8 Even though this provision is non-justiciable and 
aspirational, it is normatively significant for the acknowledgment 
                                                                                                                                    
http://scroll.in/pulse/819067/india-has-programmes-to-alleviate-
hunger-but-not-the-will-to-enforce-them. 
4 Supra note 3. 
5Jacquline Mowbray, The Right to Food and the International Economic 
System: An Assessment of the Rights-Based Approach to the Problem of World 
Hunger, 20 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 545 (2007). 
6AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND 
DEPRIVATION, 75-77 (Oxford University Press, 1983).  
7Id. 
8 INDIA CONST., art. 47. 
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of nutritional security as a primary mandate of the state. Further, 
the non-binding Directive Principles have been considered by the  
Indian judiciary as a vital component aiding in the  interpretation 
of the scope of fundamental rights.9 Thus, the right to food has 
slowly permeated into the jurisprudence of fundamental rights 
through the interpretive expansion of right to life in the decade 
after the Emergency.10 Through several cases in the last three 
decades, the right to food has been grounded within the right to 
life, as a fundamental right to life, enshrined in Article 21 of the 
Constitution.11 The sustained intervention of the Apex Court in the 
People‟s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) case has firmly 
entrenched the right to food as a fundamental entitlement, so much 
so it has also acted as a catalyst for enactment of the National Food 
Security Act, 2013.12 
II. Expanding Article 21: Right to Food as an Unenumerated 
Constituent of Right to Life 
As mentioned earlier, the right to food was enshrined in the 
Constitution as a non-justiciable Directive Principle of State Policy 
in Article 47. However, the gradual expansion of the ambit of the 
fundamental right to life that took place in the 1980s‟ embraced the 
right to food within its scope too.13 The first major case where the 
linkage between right to food and the right to life was underscored 
by the judiciary was Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator.14  
Ironically, this case was not directly related to hunger or starvation, 
                                                          
9 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180. 
10 Jean Dreze, Democracy and Right to Food, 39 (17) ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL WEEKLY 1723 (April 24, 2004). 
11 Id. 
12 Lauren Birchfield and Jessica Corsi, Between Starvation and 
Globalization: Realising the Right to Food in India, 31 MICH. J. INT‟L L.J 691 
(2009). 
13 Supra note 10; See also Paul O‟Connell, Vindicating Socio-Economic 
Rights: International Standards and Comparative Experience (2012) and K.C. 
Prakash, A Critical Analysis of Right to Life and Judicial Interventions in 
South Asian Countries, 3 KATHMANDU SCH. L. REV. 198 (2013). 
14AIR 1981 SC 746. 
Saurabh Bhattacharjee        From Francis Coralie Mullin to Swaraj Abhiyan 
25 
 
but arose from a habeas corpus petition challenging the conditions 
of detention of a foreign national arrested under an anti-smuggling 
statute and his rights of access to lawyers and members of his 
family. While dealing with the petition, the Supreme Court relied 
on an American precedent to rule that “the right to life enshrined in 
Article 21 cannot be restricted to mere animal existence.”15 The 
Court went on to observe that the “right to life includes the right to 
live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the 
bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition,  clothing  and  
shelter.”16 This  pronouncement  not  only  paved  the  way  for  
incremental expansion of right to life, wherein several socio-
economic rights were read into the right,17  but also, explicitly 
grounded right to food as a direct constituent of the right to life.  
However, since the case did not directly deal with starvation and 
hunger, it had a limited impact on setting out the normative 
content of the right to food, especially regarding governmental 
policies. This was not the case with Kishen Pattnayak v State of 
Orissa18 which pertained to a Public Interest Litigation, (PIL) 
alleging starvation deaths of inhabitants in districts of Kalahandi 
and Koraput, due to negligence of the District Administration and 
the Government. The Supreme Court admitted the petition and 
directed the District Judge of Kalahandi to enquire as to whether 
the State Government had implemented the social welfare 
measures in the district and assess the adequacy of the same. Based 
on the Report of the District Judge and provisions of Orissa Relief 
Code, the Court directed the State Government to form the Natural 
Calamities Committee for the District, as per the Orissa Relief Code 
and “nominate the names of at least five persons belonging to  
recognized voluntary organisations.”19 The Court also clarified that 
the “function of the Committee will not be confined only to the 
                                                          
15Id. at 769. 
16Id. at 771. 
17J.S. Verma, Recent Judicial Trends in Enforcement of Freedoms, 27 COMMW. 
L. BULL. 571 (2001). 
18AIR 1989 SC 677. 
19Id. at 261. 
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cases of starvation deaths, but it shall be responsible for looking 
after the welfare of the people of the district.”20 
This judgment did not make any direct mention of the right to food 
as a fundamental right. Yet, the case is a major milestone in the 
development of right to food, for the very fact that a petition 
related to starvation was admitted under Article 32 of the 
Constitution. Since the power under Article 32 can be invoked by 
the Supreme Court only in a case involving violation of a 
fundamental right, the admission of the petition and subsequent 
grant of relief together constitute a tacit indication that a 
fundamental right had been impinged through starvation deaths. 
Therefore, despite its silence, the judgment in Kishen Pattnayak is 
seen as a step towards the recognition of a fundamental right to 
food, or at the very least, a right against starvation in an implicit 
manner. 
III. Direct Affirmation of the Right to Food 
If Kishen Pattnayak had not explicitly spoken of a fundamental right 
to food, the Supreme Court was far more direct in situating the 
right to food in Part III of the Constitution in People's Union for Civil 
Liberties v. Union of India and Others.21 The case originated from a 
PIL filed, in July 2001, in the backdrop of a prolonged drought and 
agrarian crisis, against the state of Rajasthan, due to its failure to 
provide employment and food relief as mandated by the Rajasthan 
Famine Code of 1962.22 In a series of interim orders, the Supreme 
Court recognized the right to food as derived from Articles 21 and 
47 of the Constitution and “explicitly established a constitutional 
human right to food in India”.23 In more concrete terms, the Court 
held that several existing governmental schemes connected with 
nutrition, constituted legal entitlements under the fundamental 
right to food. Through the instrument of continuing mandamus 
                                                          
20Id. 
21Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001. 
22 Supra note 12. 
23Dipika Jain and Brian Tonic, Implementation of the Public Distribution 
System: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Food in an Urban Slum, 12 J. 
FOOD. L. &POL‟Y 53 (2016). 
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and several interim orders, the Supreme Court steered the direction 
of these schemes and laid down the contours of the mode of their 
implementation.24  These orders have cumulatively entrenched the 
right to food as a core fundamental right in the Indian 
constitutional milieu. But the question that arises as a result is 
whether the recognition of the right to food has   a concrete impact 
on state policies. Similarly, another critical issue that requires 
further inquiry is whether the Court‟s intervention in the PUCL 
case reveals a coherent conception of the duties that comprise the 
right to food. 
Every legal right enjoins a corresponding duty and indeed, the crux 
of a legal right lies in the fact that it vests a co-related obligation on 
another person or a set of persons. A rhetorical articulation of a 
legal or a constitutional right does not carry any substantive 
weight, without clarity on corresponding duties.25 Therefore, the 
normative recognition of right to food within the Indian 
constitutional framework can be a mere cosmetic exercise without 
rigorous analysis of the duties that the right carries. However, since 
a major portion of the judicial dicta in the PUCL case is  in the form 
of interim orders that revolve around the nuts and bolts of 
governmental schemes on nutrition, they lack a direct articulation 
of the core enforceable content of the right to food.26 
In view of this lacuna, this part of the paper shall map out the 
different axis of intervention of the judiciary, on cases pertaining to 
the right to food with the aim of throwing some light on the content 
of the right. Judicial intervention on right to food in India, as 
shaped by the PUCL case and other associated decisions, have 
broadly involved: a) Identification of schemes that constitute legal 
entitlements, b) Modification of existing schemes, c) Fixation of 
                                                          
24Supra note 12. 
25See generally for an assessment of rights and duties, Henry Shue, Basic 
Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy, Princeton (1980). 
26Yamini Jaishankar and Jean Dreze, Supreme Court Orders on the Right 
to Food: A Tool for Action (2005), http:// 
www.righttofoodindia.org/data/scordersprimer.doc. 
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accountability of officers and d) Establishment of an institutional 
framework for monitoring enforcements. 
The initial intervention of the Supreme Court in the PUCL case 
revolved around transformation of administratively established 
food security schemes into enforceable legal entitlements. The first 
major interim order of the Supreme Court in this case, passed on 
28th November 2001, focused on eight food-related schemes: (1) the 
Public Distribution System (PDS); (2) Antyodaya Anna Yojana 
(AAY); (3) the National Programme of Nutritional Support to 
Primary Education, also known as “Mid-Day Meal Scheme” 
(MDMS); (4) the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS); (5) 
Annapurna; (6) the National Old Age Pension Scheme (NOAPS); 
(7) the National Maternity Benefit Scheme (NMBS); and (8) the 
National Family Benefit Scheme (NFBS). Through subsequent 
interim orders, the Sampoorna Gramin Rozgar Yojana (SGRY) was 
also turned into a legal entitlement. Most of the later interim orders 
were concerned with modalities of implementing these schemes.27 
The conversion of the benefits assured by these schemes into 
constitutional entitlements was practically significant in so far as 
persons who were denied these benefits could claim their due as a 
matter of right and approach a court of law for appropriate 
recourse. 
In addition to identifying schemes that formed constitutional 
entitlements, the Court also shaped the trajectory of these schemes. 
In fact, the benefits available under these schemes have also been 
altered through judicial dicta. These modifications are illustrated 
by the changes brought about by the Supreme Court to the MDMS. 
The Court called upon all the State Governments to introduce 
cooked mid-day meals in primary schools and instructed them to 
replace monthly „ dry rations‟ of grain with daily, cooked mid-day 
meals. Further, it also mandated that the states continue the MDMS 
in schools in drought affected areas during the summer vacations 
too. The other major notable modification was the direction on 
universalisation of ICDS, a scheme aimed at providing young 
children with a package comprising of supplementary nutrition, 
                                                          
27Supra note 12. 
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health care and pre-school education. It also aimed at supporting 
adolescent girls, pregnant women and lactating mothers. The Court 
mandated that ICDS services should never be restricted just to BPL 
families alone, but to all children of a specific age-group.28 
Similarly, the annual allocation of both cash and food grains for the 
Sampoorna Gramin Rozgar Yojana(„food for work‟) employment 
programme during the months of May, June, and July was doubled 
by the Court. The Court also directed the state governments to 
focus the SGRY programme towards agricultural wage earners, 
non-agricultural unskilled wage earners, marginal farmers and, in 
particular, SC and ST persons whose wage income constitutes a 
reasonable proportion of their household income. In the same 
order, the Court also prohibited the use of contractors for the 
SGRY. The Judiciary‟s endeavour to modify the content of the 
nutritional schemes is also illustrated by the alterations proposed to 
AAY scheme. The Court ruled that the aged, infirm, disabled, 
destitute men and women, pregnant and lactating women, 
destitute women, widows, (2) widows and other single women 
with no regular support; (3) households with disabled adults, (4) 
denotified primitive tribes, should be brought within the ambit of 
priority households and should be entitled to Antyodaya Card as a 
matter of right. Most critically, the Court also restrained the 
Government from unilaterally modifying the scheme. The Court 
stated that “no scheme covered by the orders made by this Court… 
shall be discontinued or restricted in any way without the prior 
approval of this Court.”29 
V. The Need for Fixation of Accountability 
A novel step taken by the Court in the PUCL case, was to precisely 
pinpoint the responsibility of implementation of the scheme and its 
                                                          
28Yamini Jaishankar and Jean Dreze, Supreme Court Orders on the Right 
to Food: A Tool for Action (2005), http:// 
www.righttofoodindia.org/data/scordersprimer.doc. 
29 Yamini Jaishankar and Jean Dreze, Supreme Court Orders on the Right 
to Food: A Tool for Action (2005), http:// 
www.righttofoodindia.org/data/scordersprimer.doc. 
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directions on specific officers. The Court recognized that affixation 
of individual responsibility on particular officers and institutions 
would induce more robust implementation and identified the 
officers to be held responsible. In the case of State Governments, 
the Chief Secretary was made answerable to the Court on behalf of 
the government. As far as orders addressed to specific departments 
or ministries were concerned, it was held that the Secretaries of 
those departments or ministries would be responsible for the 
implementation of orders relevant to them. Moving on to district-
level compliance, the Court indicated that the CEO/ Collector 
would be responsible.30 
The Supreme Court not only turned the existing nutrition-related 
schemes into constitutional legal entitlements but also tried to set-
up an institutional mechanism for monitoring the implementation 
of these schemes. On the one hand, the Court strengthened the role 
of existing Panchayati Raj institutions. The Gram Sabhas were held 
to be entitled to conduct social audit into all Food/Employment 
schemes and to report all instances to misuse of funds to the 
respective implementing authorities. On the other hand, the Court 
setup parallel bodies too. The Court appointed two Commissioners 
through two separate orders in 2002 and 2003. They were given the 
task of looking into grievances regarding food entitlement schemes 
and monitoring and reporting the extent of implementation. They 
were also empowered to take assistance from other reliable persons 
and organizations.31 In pursuance of this mandate, the 
Commissioners also appointed several state-level advisors to 
“function as a bridge between the Commissioners, state 
governments, and civil society.”32 These officers have been able to 
provide contemporary information about compliance from the field 
level to the Supreme Court, thus shaping the directions of 
subsequent orders. They have also facilitated better administrative 
response to the judicial orders through dialogical engagement with 
government functionaries. According to Birchfield and Corsi: 
                                                          
30 Yamini Jaishankar and Jean Dreze, Supreme Court Orders on the Right 
to Food: A Tool for Action (2005), http:// 
www.righttofoodindia.org/data/scordersprimer.doc. 
31Supra note 26. 
32Supra note 12. 
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The Commission seeks open lines of communication 
to encourage state implementation and to propose 
modification of food and work policies. The work of 
the Commission is largely focused on building 
relationships with state officials and using those 
successfully forged partnerships to resolve 
grievances and foster political will for 
implementation of court orders.33 
In addition, the Court provided significant space to civil society 
organizations which were behind the original petition. This 
combination of Court-appointed Commissioners, Advisors and 
civil society campaigns, engendered a robust framework for 
monitoring and strengthening the implementation of the schemes. 
This has resulted in well-crafted directions from the judiciaries, 
which have been supplemented by vigorous supervision on 
implementation. 
VI. Multidimensionality and Conditional Approach: 
Exploring the Content of Right to Food 
In the preceding section, the different axis of judicial intervention 
on the right to food have been mapped out. A PIL that was filed 
against the Union of India and a few states, currently applies to all 
state governments. This case has also triggered many similar 
petitions seeking judicial monitoring of food security schemes at 
the High Court level .34 The sustained intervention on the part of 
the Court on a myriad of issues, including hunger, child nutrition 
and development, and unemployment, has led to an overhaul of 
the public distribution system in India and has expanded access to 
food security for many deprived sections of the Indian citizenry. 
Given that the case originated in a politico-economic context of 
gradual roll back of public distribution service that was attempted 
in the late 1990s, Supreme Court‟s involvement safeguarded public 
food security schemes from further assault in the name of 
liberalization and privatization.35 But what do these orders say 
                                                          
33Id. at 728. 
34Supra note 23. 
35Supra note 12. 
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about the content of the right to food? In this section, it is argued 
that an analysis of judicial dicta in the PUCL case and other related 
cases reveal the following about the Indian judiciary‟s conception 
of the right to food: a) multidimensionality of right to food and b) 
conditional content of the right. 
The constitutional right to food has been interpreted in a holistic 
manner, where the linkage between nutrition and health, shelter 
and work has been appreciated. The Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has noted that “violating the 
right to food may impair the enjoyment of other human rights, 
such as the right to health, education or life, and vice versa.”36 
Starting with Francis Mullin in the 1980s to Laxmi Mandal and 
Swaraj Abhiyan in this decade, courts have underscored this 
interrelatedness of the 'right to food', right to health, right to shelter 
and right to work. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in 
Francis Coralie Mullin had stated that the right to life “cannot be 
restricted to mere animal existence” and that it “includes the right 
to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, 
the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and 
shelter.”37 This observation squarely connected adequate nutrition 
with clothing and shelter and set the tone for a multidimensional 
interpretation of the right to food. Almost three decades later, the 
Delhi High Court emphasized on the interrelatedness of the 'right 
to food' and the right to reproductive health of the mother and the 
right to health of the infant child. 
In Laxmi Mandal v. Deen Dayal Upadhyay Hospital38, the Court, while 
referring to directions issued in the PUCL case, observed: 
There could not be a better illustration of the 
indivisibility of basic human rights as enshrined in 
the Constitution of India. Particularly in the context 
of a welfare State, where the central focus of these 
centrally sponsored schemes is the economically and 
                                                          
36Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations, 
The Right to Adequate Food, Fact Sheet No. 34, April 2010, 
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/factsheet34en.pdf. 
37Supra note 14. 
382010 Ind law DEL 3281. 
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socially disadvantaged sections of society, the above 
orders of the Supreme Court have to be understood 
as preserving, protecting and enforcing the different 
facets of the right to life under Article 21 of the 
Constitution. As already noted, these petitions focus 
on two inalienable survival rights that form part of 
the right to life. One is the right to health, which 
would include the right to access government 
(public) health facilities and receive a minimum 
standard of treatment and care. The other facet is the 
right to food which is seen as integral to the right to 
life and right to health.39 
It is also obvious that such recognition of inter-linkages is not 
limited merely to a set of rhetorical claims, but has also shaped the 
content of the concrete relief awarded by courts. In the Kishen 
Pattnayak case, the Supreme Court had, while directing the 
constitution of the Natural Calamities Committee, broadened its 
mandate. The Court had stated that the Committee will not be 
confined just  to the cases of starvation deaths, but shall also be 
responsible for looking after the welfare of the people of the 
district. This was an acknowledgement of the inextricable 
connection between nutrition and general welfare. 
The association between right to food and other unenumerated 
components of right to life like shelter, livelihood and health in the 
field of remedies, is indicated in several interim orders of the 
Supreme Court in the PUCL case too. Indeed, the wide spectrum of 
interim orders passed in that case strongly reflect the 
multidimensional nature of right to food. Several of the interim 
orders, issued in the last 5 years, have related to shelter for 
homeless persons. An interim application was filed seeking 
directions of the Court enjoining the state governments to set up 
night-time shelter-homes for homeless persons residing on streets. 
The Supreme Court not only admitted the application but also 
passed directions on construction of the same in various urban 
                                                          
39Id. 
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areas. Moreover, the Commissioners and Advisors were tasked 
with monitoring of construction of such shelters.40 
Further, many of the schemes that were turned into legal 
entitlements dealt as much with health and livelihood, as with 
nutrition. The Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) and 
the National Maternity Benefit Scheme (NMBS) relate to maternal 
and neo-natal health through nutrition. Similarly, the Sampoorna 
Gramin Rozgar Yojana (SGRY), which was later brought within the 
purview of the PUCL case, pertains to livelihood and employment. 
The link between livelihood and right to food was also 
acknowledged in the recent case of Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of 
India41 where the Court referred to the role of the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act and its effective implementation in 
addressing food insecurity in drought areas. All these decisions 
demonstrate Indian judiciary‟s appreciation of the indivisibility of 
right to food as a component of right to life and its inextricable 
connection to right to health, shelter, livelihood and other basic 
human rights. 
A perusal of all the orders in the PUCL case and the decisions in 
the associated cases of Laxmi Mandal and Swaraj Abhiyan reveal that 
the courts have not elaborated on the systemic content of the right. 
None of the decisions indicate any core systemic content that the 
right to food possesses. Instead, the judicial discourse has focused 
on the benefits available and guaranteed under the various 
schemes and the implementation of those benefits. This model of 
articulating the content of the right to food, mirrors the conditional 
social right model, propounded by Madhav Khosla, wherein courts 
instead of asserting the innate content of a right, focus on measures 
undertaken by the state and their implementation.42 In other words, 
the content of the right becomes conditional upon state action.43 
This implies that instead of assessing adequacy of statutory and 
administrative benefits against an autonomous constitutional 
                                                          
40PUCL v Union India, (2013) 11 SCC 505. 
41Id. 
42Madhav Khosla, Making Social Rights Conditional: Lessons from India, 8 
INT‟L J. CONST. L. 739, 742 (2010). 
43Id. 
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standard, judicial review is geared towards addressing issues in 
implementing the existing benefits. 
That the content of the right to food is conceived as contingent 
upon state action is best illustrated by the observation of the 
Supreme Court in the Swaraj Abhiyan case where the Court stated: 
No mandamus can be issued by this Court to the 
State Governments to implement the NFS Act 
beyond what is required by the terms and 
provisions of the statute…it is not possible for us to 
issue a positive direction to the State Governments 
to make available to any needy persons any item 
over and above what is mandated by the NFS Act44 
That the observation in Swaraj Abhiyan is not an aberration, but in 
line with the established tradition of judicial dicta being concerned 
with issues in implementation is apparent in the PUCL case. The 
schemes that were turned into constitutional entitlements by the 
PUCL bench were all pre-existing administrative schemes that had 
been announced by the government. 
The basis of the entitlement was not so much any autonomous 
systemic minimum content of the right to food as much as the 
existence of the schemes framed by the Government. Admittedly, 
the Court did modify many of the schemes, but such modifications 
were either driven by imperatives for implementation or guided by 
policy preferences. They were also not grounded on any systemic 
content of the right to food. The same is reflected in the decision of 
the Delhi High Court in the Laxmi Mandal case where compensation 
was awarded for non-compliance with the conditions that the 
National Maternity Benefit Scheme (NMBS) and the Janani 
Suraksha Yojana (JSY) provided.45 All these cases demonstrate that 
the enforceable content of the right to food in any case is being 
determined by the existing schemes or statutory regimes 
introduced by the government and not with reference to any non-
derogable minima that the right connotes. As a result, adjudication 
of claims relating to the right to food has centered more around 
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questions of implementation of existing schemes, than around 
adequacy of benefits. In other words, the evolution of judicial 
conception of right to food vindicates the model of conditional 
social right proposed by Madhav Khosla. 
The use of conditional social right approach to secure the right to 
food over a systemic content approach is not merely a matter of 
academic significance, but has a direct bearing on the scope of 
judicial review and adjudicatory remedies. For example, in the 
Swaraj Abhiyan case, a systemic model of right to food would have 
caused the Court to examine the adequacy of the benefits accorded 
by the National Food Security Act as against the minimum content 
of right to food. Instead, the conditional social right approach, as 
discussed earlier, led the Court to limit its analysis to the provisions 
and terms of the Act. Conversely, Court‟s emphasis on more robust 
implementation of existing nutrition related schemes in response to 
a petition asserting the right to food, begs the question as to what 
the response of the court would have been, if schemes like TPDS, 
AAY, MDMS did not already exist on paper. 
Regardless of the absence of a systemic content of the right, the 
conditional social right approach to right to food does offer certain 
benefits. As Madhav Khosla argues, a conditional recognition of the 
right to food, as limited as it is, does perform an expressive role by 
changing the social meaning attached the claim of food.46 Further, 
by shifting the lens to the implementation of schemes and statutory 
regimes, courts continually remind the state of its obligations and 
allow the judiciary to examine state performance.47 It needs to be 
pointed out  in this context, that the conditional social right model 
provides an effective response to the institutional objections to 
judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights. One of the most 
noteworthy arguments against adjudication of socio-economic 
rights, is that it is anti-democratic in so far as it undermines the 
institutional separation of powers between the judiciary, the 
legislative and the executive branches of the government.48 This 
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argument is predicated on the claim that realization of such rights 
essentially involves policy choices and therefore are best left to 
political branches.49 
The conditional social right model addresses this criticism, since 
the courts do not frame new schemes or create new substantive 
rights, but only turn existing schemes into entitlements. The Court 
defers from the policy choices exercised by the legislative and 
executive branches of the government while strengthening their 
implementation framework under this approach. Thus, courts can 
escape the charge of undermining the principle of separation of 
powers and therefore, the conditional social rights approach can 
strengthen the legitimacy of judicial enforcement of right to food. 
However, a major weakness of this model lies in the fact that since 
adjudication is predicated on existing schemes and statutory 
regimes, absence of strong substantial benefits under applicable 
schemes or legal regimes may render the right to food a mere 
cosmetic adornment. Nonetheless, it is hoped that the conditional 
social right model would guard itself against its logical extreme of 
the right being negated by complete absence of a policy.50 
VII. Conclusion 
The past three decades have seen a gradual transformation of the 
right to food from a non-justiciable directive, to a fundamental 
right, as part of right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the 
Constitution. What commenced with an expressive reference to the 
right to food in Francis Coralie Mullin was followed with an 
implied recognition of the same in the Kishen Pattnayak case. It 
finally culminated in an explicit recognition of the right after the 
15-year long battle initiated in the PUCL case. As this paper has 
argued, the recognition of the right to food has not only been a 
matter of expressive significance but has also had a concrete impact 
on actual governmental policies and their implementation. This is 
reflected most notably in the PUCL case where several 
governmental food security-related schemes were given the status 
of enforceable legal entitlements, principles of accountability of 
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concerned officers were laid down and an institutional framework 
for monitoring enforcement was established. 
These judiciary-driven doctrinal and institutional changes have 
been at the vanguard of overhaul of India‟s public food distribution 
schemes and has led to the more robust implementation of 
nutrition related programmes.51 They have also played the role of a 
catalyst in the adoption of the National Food Security Act 2013, at 
the central level, that provides for a statutory framework for 
enforcement of food security schemes and articulates the respective 
obligations of central and state governments, as well as those of the 
Panchayati Raj institutions.52 Most pertinently, the Act allows state 
governments continue with or formulate food or nutrition schemes 
that provide for higher benefits than those provided under this Act. 
In pursuance of this, the Tamil Nadu Government has retained its 
policy of universal public distribution system that is not restricted 
to persons only below the poverty line.53 Similarly, the West Bengal 
Government has launched the Khadya Sathi Scheme that provides 
rice at Rs 2 per kg.54 These schemes are only a few select instances 
of state governments initiating their own schemes on food security. 
Not surprisingly, the last decade has seen substantial improvement 
in implementation of nutrition-related schemes.  According to the 
India Human Development Survey, leakages in PDS were reduced 
from 49 per cent in 2004-05 to 32 per cent in 2011-12. Reduction of 
leakages have been far more pronounced in the poorest states. 
There have also been significant gains in various nutritional 
indicators in the last decade with most of the poorest states being 
able to reduce the number of underweight children.55 These 
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instances illustrate that the judicial dicta on the right to food, has 
not merely had any symbolic value but has been able to give 
impetus to incremental institutional and policy changes. The other 
notable facet of the judicial recognition of the right to food in India 
has been its holistic interpretation, wherein, the linkage between 
nutrition and health, shelter and work has been underscored 
Further, as has been demonstrated by the scope of the orders issued 
in some of the preceding cases, such holistic approach has not been 
limited merely to rhetorical claims but has also shaped the content 
of the concrete relief awarded by courts. 
This essay has also shown that the adjudicatory lens of Indian 
courts on the right to food have failed to articulate systemic content 
on what the right entails. This has resulted in a conditional 
approach with no autonomous content and where the 
corresponding obligations enjoined by the right to food are 
determined by the content of existing schemes and statutory 
regimes. While this model can provide an effective response to the 
claim that adjudication of socio-economic rights suffers from 
democratic deficit, there is a danger of weak administrative and 
statutory regimes denuding the right of its content. Since the 
contours of adjudication are shaped by existing schemes and 
statutory regimes, absence of adequate benefits in existing regimes 
may mean that judicial intervention would not carry any 
substantive content. As such, the conditional social right model 
adopted by the Indian judiciary to right to food, is a minimalist 
approach. Nonetheless, such a conditional model geared towards 
more effective implementation has the potential for transformative 
changes in the Indian socio-political context, characterized by a 
blend of broad ambitious policy pronouncements and poor 
administrative implementation. The incremental overhaul of the 
food security schemes in India, in the aftermath of judicial 
recognition of the right to food, stands as a testament to that.  
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